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POWERLESS: DEPRIVATION OF AGENCY
BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE LEGAL
AND CARCERAL SYSTEMS
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INTRODUCTION
The charges against Philadelphia Police Officer Phillip Nordo
read like an episode of The Shield.1 The grand jury presentment,
should you have the stomach for it, is closer to Law & Order:
Special Victims Unit.2 For over twenty years, Officer Nordo
groomed, sexually assaulted, and used crime reward funds to pay
off vulnerable men in Philadelphia.3 Whether in his transport van,
prison visiting rooms, or police interrogation rooms, he regularly
exploited his unfettered access to and absolute control over
vulnerable individuals.4 Though he was not convited until 2022,
the communities he stalked and preyed upon knew exactly what
Nordo was doing in the decades leading up to his arrest.5 Living
in the streets where Nordo flexed his considerable power, these
Philadelphians had nowhere to run, and no one to whom to report
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1
See Criminal Docket, Commonwealth v. Nordo, CP-51-CR-0001856-2019, (Pa. D &
C.2d filed Mar. 15, 2019), https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?
docketNumber=CP-51-CR-00018562019&dnh=1%2FhdrNrdxjlmmTVisHyuLQ%3D%3D
[https://perma.cc/5LJM-VZNG]. On June 1, Phillip Nordo was convicted of rape, official
oppression, stalking, and theft. His victims were men whom he met in his official capacity
with the Philadelphia Police Department. See Samantha Melamed, A Philly Homicide
Detective was Convicted of Raping Witnesses. What Happens to Those he Locked Up?
PHILA. INQUIRER (June 1, 2022), https://www.inquirer.com/news/philadelphia-homicidedetective-phillip-nordo-cases-exonerations-20220601.html.
2
Presentment No. VII at 4–5, In re: The Twenty-Ninth Investigating Grand Jury,
Misc. No. 0006987-2016, (Pa. D. & C.2d filed Feb. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Presentment No.
VII], https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/15116066/2019/02/philnordo-presentment-2.19.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NK2-TSKL].
3
Id. at 5–9.
4
Id. at 4, 7.
5
See, e.g., Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal
Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2093 (2017).
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the bad detective. They could not call the other officers who took
turns leaving Nordo alone with suspects for long stretches of time.
Nor could they rely on the Internal Affairs Division, who
corroborated rape allegations against Nordo and then kept him on
payroll for another decade.6 And they certainly could not turn to
Philadelphia prosecutors, who had quietly put Nordo on a “no call
list.”7
This Article is not about Phillip Nordo. This Article is about
the outright excision of agency that our legal system exacts on
vulnerable communities.8 At every stage, our legal system strips
already marginalized communities of power, particularly
communities of color.9 Mass incarceration, a mechanism to uphold
white supremacy, has further corroded individual and collective
autonomy in these communities. This Article examines the ways
in which law enforcement, the legal system, and the carceral state
remove agency from individuals. In the final section, this Article
suggests measures to immediately empower incarcerated
individuals who have been stripped of their agency by our system.

6

Presentment No. VII, supra note 2, at 12–13.
See, e.g., Mark Fazlollah, Accused Philly Police Officers Get Reassigned to the
‘Last Place’ They Should Be, Critics Say, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 22, 2019),
https://www.inquirer.com/news/philadelphia-police-department-misconduct-taintedcops-corruption-homeland-security-center-20190322.html.
8
Monica C. Bell describes this as “legal estrangement,” the “structural[ ]
ostraciz[ation] through law’s ideals and priorities.” Bell, supra note 5, at 2085–86.
Bell’s concept of “legal estrangement” moves past the concepts of theories of
legitimacy, legal cynicism, and procedural unfairness to describe a “cultural and
systemic mechanism” that is “partly representative of a state of anomie related to the
law and legal authorities, and [ ] interacts with legal and other structural conditions—
for example, poverty, racism, and gender hierarchy—to maintain segregation and
dispossession.” Id. Further, Bell argues that “legal estrangement is a product of three
socio-legal processes: procedural injustice, vicarious marginalization, and structural
exclusion.” Id. at 2100.
9
Aggressive policing practices target neighborhoods of color, especially those
communities with dense populations of Black individuals. See Anthony A. Braga et
al., Race, Place, and Effective Policing, 45 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 535, 535–37 (2019). See
also Plaintiffs’ Tenth Report to Court on Stop and Frisk Practices: Fourteenth
Amendment Issues at 2–3, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, 2:10-cv-05952, (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 24, 2020), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.paed.394493/
gov.uscourts.paed.394493.106.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/T68K-X5FL] (indicating that
Black individuals are fifty percent more likely to be stopped and forty percent more
likely to be frisked than white individuals; in Philadelphia seventy percent of stopped
individuals were Black, though Black individuals make up only forty percent of the
population).
7
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I. THE OBLIGATION TO REMAIN SILENT: EXCISION OF AGENCY
BEGINNING WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT
Picture this: you are arrested. It is 11:00 at night. You are
picked up in a van. You are not given a telephone call. You are
cuffed to a table in an interrogation room and left overnight. You
are held for forty-eight hours. After two days and two nights of
questioning with no sleep, food, or drink, you are exhausted. You
are told that if you sign a confession, you can go home. You sign
it, but you never go home. This may seem out of the ordinary, but
it is not. Across this country, people sit in prison having been
“discretionarily” stopped10 and searched without probable cause,11
having falsely confessed,12 or having been convicted of a crime on
the testimony of a lone police officer witness,13 informant,14 or an
otherwise incentivized witness.15 Indeed, these are the tactics
recited in the indictment of Phillip Nordo.16 But they are certainly
not unique to him. Many shadowy police practices are standard

10

Further,
[p]roactive policing practices, such as hot-spot policing, stop-and-frisk
policies, and “investigatory stops,” have become ubiquitous over the past four
decades—expanding police discretion and increasing police contacts with the
public. These types of proactive policies are scrutinized, in part, because they
tend disproportionately to target Black and Latinx individuals and
communities and young people.
Anne McGlynn-Wright et al., The Usual, Racialized, Suspects: The Consequence of
Police Contacts with Black and White Youth on Adult Arrest, SOC. PROBS. 1, 2 (2020).
11
“Justice Department investigations across the country have illustrated how
these astounding numbers of warrants can be used by police to stop people without
cause.” Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2068 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
12
See, e.g., Emily West & Vanessa Meterko, Innocence Project: DNA Exonerations,
1989-2014: Review of Data and Findings from the First 25 Years, 79 ALB. L. REV. 717,
761 (2016) (“[O]ver a quarter (27%) of the 325 DNA exoneration cases involved false
confessions—either by the exoneree him or herself, or by a co-defendant.”).
13
See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 378 (2011) (permitting a police
officer to testify as to a statement given to police by a wounded crime victim
identifying the person who shot him).
14
See West & Meterko, supra note 12, at 766 (“Informants contributed to wrongful
conviction in 15% (48) of the 325 DNA exonerations.”).
15
Id. at 766, 768 (discussing incentivized informants). Additionally, noninformant witnesses (such as alleged eye-witnesses) often receive crime reward money
or other benefits, which may go undisclosed at trial.
16
Presentment No. VII, supra note 2, at 4–38.
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operating procedures.17 Practices such as arbitrary18 and lengthy
detention without arrest,19 and days-long interrogations20 during
which individuals are denied sleep21 or telephone calls,22
disempower individuals from the moment of police contact. Postcharging practices such as holding individuals without affordable
bail for long periods of time, without even a thought to the
collateral consequences—loss of employment, housing, and family
support—are so commonplace that we do not even question them.23
Yet, they strip individuals of everything; individuals who are
presumed innocent.

17

See, e.g., Strieff, 136 S.Ct. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
The New York City Police Department long trained officers to, in the words
of a District Judge, “stop and question first, develop reasonable suspicion
later.” The Utah Supreme Court described as “ ‘routine procedure’ ” or
“ ‘common practice’ ” the decision of Salt Lake City police officers to run
warrant checks on pedestrians they detained without reasonable suspicion.
In the related context of traffic stops, one widely followed police manual
instructs officers looking for drugs to “run at least a warrants check on all
drivers you stop. Statistically, narcotics offenders are . . . more likely to fail
to appear on simple citations, such as traffic or trespass violations, leading
to the issuance of bench warrants. Discovery of an outstanding warrant gives
you cause for an immediate custodial arrest and search of the suspect.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
18
See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop
and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2431, n.7 (2017)
(citing “prolonged detention” as “a real concern in a jurisdiction where police have
arrest quotas to fill”).
19
See Steven J. Mulroy, “Hold” On: The Remarkably Resilient, Constitutionally
Dubious 48-Hour Hold, 63 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 815, 816 (2013).
20
See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1051, 1095 (2010) (discussing “lengthy confessions” as a factor that courts
consider in evaluating voluntariness of a confession, some occurring over the course
of days, without allowing for sleep or meals).
21
See id. (discussing the deprivation of food and sleep as a factor in considered by
courts in evaluating voluntariness of a confession).
22
See, e.g., Complaint for Mandamus and Injunctive Relief at 11,
#LetUsBreatheCollective v. City of Chicago, No. 2020CH04654, (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 23,
2020) (internal citations omitted), https://www.cookcountypublicdefender.org
/sites/default/files/attorney_access_complaint_with_exhibits_file_stamped.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VU54-8GMC] (“Between April 16, 2020 and June 5, 2020, the
PUBLIC DEFENDER surveyed 1,468 people in bond court. Of the 1,468 surveyed, 338
(23%) stated that CPD [Chicago Police Department] never offered them access to a
phone at any point while they were detained at the police station. . . . The average
wait time for individuals who were offered a phone call was 4.2 hours.”).
23
See Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J.
723, 724–25, 739 (2011) (discussing the history of bail in the United States, as favored
and then largely disfavored, as an abandonment of the presumption of innocence).
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Of course, this underlies so many issues in our system: the
presumption of guilt ascribed to entire communities. As Justice
Sotomayor wrote, dissenting in a stop and frisk case:
[I]t is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims
of this type of scrutiny. See M. Alexander, The New Jim Crow
95–136 (2010). For generations, [B]lack and [B]rown parents
have given their children “the talk”—instructing them never to
run down the street; always keep your hands where they can be
seen; do not even think of talking back to a stranger—all out of
fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them.
See, e.g., W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1903); J.
Baldwin, The Fire Next Time (1963); T. Coates, Between the
World and Me (2015).24

II. THE ENCUMBRANCE OF COUNSEL: EXPROPRIATION OF
AUTONOMY THROUGH THE LEGAL SYSTEM
For individuals targeted by shadowy police practices,
particularly people of color, the dismissal of individual rights and
dismantling of agency will not stop at the courthouse door.
Prosecutors did not stop Philip Nordo. Instead, they put him on a
“no call list,” preventing defendants from questioning him about
his predilections.25 Nor would the defense bar have been equipped
to uncover Nordo’s crimes. In the courts, the victims of arbitrary
policing will continue to receive the clear message: you have no
power here.
Once individuals have lost the benefit of the doubt, the burden
is on them to prove their innocence—but they do not have the
necessary tools or even speak the requisite language to do so.
Thus, our system purports to afford the right to counsel, an expert
advocate, skilled at speaking the language of law, experienced in
navigating the criminal legal system, and adept at advocating
zealously for the rights of others.26 Yet, this is another right that,
in practice, is often more an encumbrance than entitlement.

24

Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Mark Fazlollah, ‘Restricted Duty’ Officers Work at Sensitive Locale,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 24, 2019, at A1.
26
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
25
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Once a lawyer is appointed, she becomes your agent.27 You
lose the right to speak for yourself.28 You lose the right to direct
strategic decisions.29 You lose agency. Her mere presence gives
your case the veneer of process.30
At the same time, indigent defense counsel—whether in a
defender agency or court appointed—frequently bring to bear
representation far below well-accepted standards of care.
Appointed indigent counsel, especially at the state level, face
unreasonable fee caps and resource limitations. Because of the
flat fee structure for appointed counsel representing
Philadelphians accused of homicide, one study found that counsel
would effectively be paid two dollars per hour if they devoted the
requisite number of hours to provide effective representation.31
Thus, appointed counsel take more cases in order to pay the bills.32
Public defender agencies across the country are also grossly under
resourced.33 The average public defender in this country labors
under overwhelming caseloads. In 2017, the average Rhode Island
public defender held a caseload of 1,700 cases per year; in 2007,
Kentucky public defenders each handled over 400 felony and
misdemeanor cases.34 In Missouri, trial defenders spend an
27
Recently, in Shinn v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court of the United States
repeatedly emphasized this principal, reaffirming that “[T]he attorney is the
petitioner’s agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and
the petitioner must bear the risk of attorney error.” 142 S.Ct. 1718, 1733 (2022) (citing
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991)). Unless there is a “constitutional
right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, a prisoner ordinarily must ‘bea[r]
responsibility’ for all attorney errors during those proceedings.” Id. at 1735 (internal
citations omitted). “A prisoner is ‘at fault’ even when state postconviction counsel is
negligent.” Id.
28
See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1453, 1469–75 (2005).
29
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
30
See Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122
YALE L.J. 2176, 2190–98 (2013).
31
James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer
Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154,
195 (2012).
32
See, e.g., David D. Friedman & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Indigent
Defense: Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and
Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 96 n.75
(1993).
33
Stephen F. Hanlon, Case Refusal: A Duty for a Public Defender and a Remedy
for All of a Public Defender’s Clients, 51 IND. L. REV. 59, 61 (2018).
34
Lisa C. Wood et al., Meet-and-Plead: The Inevitable Consequence of Crushing
Defender Workloads, 42 A.B.A. LITIG. 20, 22 (2016). Misdemeanor caseloads are
staggeringly high: in Chicago, Miami, and Atlanta the average defender handles 2,000
misdemeanors annually, and in New Orleans that number is 19,000 cases. Id.
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average of 84.5 hours on homicide cases.35 The concept of “meet
and plead” is a cynical but very real concept. For a defense
attorney who has 200 cases, how can she do more?36
Unmanageable caseloads are not the only effect of
underfunding. Underfunded counsel forgo investigation, forensic
analysis, expert consultation, and mental health assistance.37
They are also compensated at lower rates than prosecutors, while
often carrying more cases.38 Faced with a lack of funding, some
state courts appoint unqualified and even unwilling attorneys to
represent defendants in criminal proceedings.39 These factors
adversely impact the culture of agencies and appointed bars,
leading to a culture of indifference and bureaucracy, wherein the
hardest working attorneys are often punished, ridiculed, and
quickly burn out.40
Post-conviction proceedings provide the first and, in some
cases only, opportunity to litigate the incompetence of trial
counsel. Yet, here too, the right to post-conviction counsel has
become a liability. States routinely fail to adequately fund postconviction counsel,41 with devastating consequences for state and
35

RUBIN BROWN, THE MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC
DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS 24 (2014).
36
In some cases, counsel fails to present exculpatory evidence in counsel’s
possession. See, e.g., Reeves v. Fayette SCI, 897 F.3d 154, 164 (3d. Cir. 2018) (holding
that where an attorney possessed but failed to “present to the fact-finder the very
exculpatory evidence that demonstrates his actual innocence, such evidence
constitutes new evidence for purposes of the Schlup actual innocence gateway”).
37
See, e.g., Friedman & Schulhofer, supra note 32, at 85.
38
For example, one Tennessee law requires local governments to apportion
seventy-five cents to indigent defense for every dollar given to prosecutors. See Eve
Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 1769, 1772–73 (2016). This is so despite the fact that the prosecutors have at
their disposal separately funded law enforcement investigators as well as crime and
forensic labs at the state and local level, while defender organizations do not.
39
In 2004, after the Massachusetts legislature refused to fund compensation for
appointed counsel, private counsel refused to renew contracts and filed a class action
suit. Instead of allowing trial judges to dismiss charges against and release
unrepresented defendants, the Massachusetts Supreme Court directed courts to
appoint unqualified and even unwilling attorneys to represent them. Hanlon, supra
note 33, at 61.
40
See Primus, supra note 38, at 1772.
41
For example, attorneys who litigate on behalf of incarcerated people under
Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) are subject to draconian funding
caps by the state, which have not seen raises in decades. Currently, the state of
Pennsylvania provides PCRA attorneys a maximum of $6,000 for homicide cases, and
$2,400 for non-homicide felonies. 47 Pa. B. 3806 (Jul. 15, 2017). For context, American
Bar Association Guidelines for capital post-conviction cases anticipate thousands of
hours to adequately marshal records, thoroughly review and digest documents,
develop additional facts, and research and draft pleadings. The American Bar
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federal appeals.42 In Pennsylvania,43 these practices have resulted
in the all-too-common occurrence of lawyers filing “no merit”
letters in post-conviction cases, a practice endorsed by
Pennsylvania’s courts in Commonwealth v. Finley.44 Under Finley,
a post-conviction attorney may withdraw from a case after
submitting a “no-merit letter,” verifying that they have reviewed
their client’s case and concluded that all claims are without
merit.45 The United States Supreme Court’s affirmance46 that the
Constitution is not offended by a post-conviction attorney filing
such a letter, with no notice to his client, was premised on the
notion that there exists no constitutional right to state postconviction process or counsel,47 and no right to equal protection in
post-conviction representation.48
Association, ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 967–68 (2003) [hereinafter ABA
Guidelines].
42
Incompetent representation in the post-conviction context has far reaching
consequences for petitioners largely due to the hyper-technical limitations imposed on
the federal habeas process by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”). See generally Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and
the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever-Increasing Limitations on the
Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly
Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH L. REV. 1219 (2015).
43
Pennsylvania, used as an example here, leads the country in life without parole
sentences. Philadelphia alone sentences more people to LWOP than any other county
and 45 states. Over 2,700 Philadelphians have been sentenced to death by
incarceration. Eighty-four percent are Black. QUINN COZZENS & BRET GROTE, A WAY
OUT: ABOLISHING DEATH BY INCARCERATION IN PENNSYLVANIA, A REPORT ON LIFESENTENCES,
ABOLITIONIST
L.
CTR.
33
(2018),
WITHOUT-PAROLE
https://abolitionistlawcenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/ALC_AWayOut_27Augu
st_Full1.pdf [https://perma.cc/678E-JF5Y].
44
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213, 215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); see also
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (1988).
45
Finley, 550 A.2d at 215.
46
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 558 (1987) (declining to apply the fourstep rule for withdrawing from direct appellate representation outlined in Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)). For comparison, under Anders, counsel is only
allowed to withdraw as appellate counsel if the appeal is determined to be “wholly
frivolous.” Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fifty States: Some Appellants’ Equal
Protection is More Equal Than Others, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 631–32 (1996).
Under Finley, however, an attorney may withdraw if the client’s case merely “lacks
merit.” Finley, 481 U.S. at 553, 559.
47
Id. at 556–57. Petitioners in a post-conviction posture are not, as a matter of
federal or state constitutional law, entitled to such process, or to counsel. Id. In
Pennsylvania, the appointment of counsel in collateral proceedings is a rule-based
right, born out of the PCHA. Id. at 553–54.
48
Id. at 556 (“[T]he equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not require the appointment of an attorney for an indigent appellant just because
an affluent defendant may retain one.”).
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Dissenting, Justice Brennan observed that the court had
essentially turned the “right to effective counsel into a right to a
meaningless ritual.”49 In reality, however, the practice is worse
than meaningless, causing actual harm to the petitioner, including
revealing privileged and confidential communications with the
client and witnesses.50 As the dissent noted, it is not just that
appointed counsel goes through the motions of representing his
client, he actually “argue[s] against his or her client’s claims
without providing notice or an opportunity for that client either to
proceed pro se or to seek the advice of another attorney.”51
III. THROWING AWAY THE KEY: THE SUPPRESSION OF SELF BY
THE CARCERAL STATE
Notably, self-representation is a staggeringly infeasible
option for most who are incarcerated. In the name of “security”
and cost savings, prisons have enacted rigid restrictions around
access to legal resources and advocacy, and the courts have
acquiesced. In Lewis v. Casey, the Supreme Court held that there
is no right to prison law libraries, unless an incarcerated person
sustained “actual injury” and could
show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed
for failure to satisfy some technical requirement . . . . Or that he
had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring
before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law
library that he was unable even to file a complaint. 52

This heightened standard puts incarcerated petitioners in a
virtually-insurmountable predicament: rely on inadequate
resources to show that you have a viable legal claim that is
significantly stymied by those very inadequate resources.53 In
49

Id. at 569 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 568–69. To withdraw under Finley, defense counsel informs the court of
the issues the client has requested counsel review and why those claims fail, including
with regard to witnesses the client has requested the attorney contact. Id. In addition
to the clear ethical implications, it largely limits the post-conviction review
undertaken by the court and counsel to the record, which is antithetical to postconviction review. Id.
51
Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
52
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). In Lewis, a group of incarcerated
individuals sued the Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) for failing to
provide adequate law library facilities and legal resources, thus significantly impeding
their ability to effectively develop and raise claims. See Joseph L. Gerken, Does Lewis
v. Casey Spell the End to Court-Ordered Improvement of Prison Law Libraries?, 95
LAW LIBR. J. 491, 496–97 (2003).
53
Gerken, supra note 52, at 499.
50
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Lewis, the complainants were illiterate.54 Thus, the Court
reasoned that even if it found actual injury, the individuals
identified as being harmed could not avail themselves of an
adequate law library anyway, as they could not read.55 The Lewis
decision significantly curtailed the ability of courts to compel
prisons to provide adequate legal resources.56
The paltry legal resources provided in prison—on-site legal
assistants, limited computer access, law books—reflect the lack of
court supervision over prisons as well as the prioritization of
punishment and security over the empowerment and selfsufficiency of incarcerated people.57 By way of example, at SCI
Phoenix in Pennsylvania, there is one computer for every 200
individuals.58 Individuals are required to sign up for limited
blocks of time,59 which provides their sole opportunity to conduct
intensive research of the case law and make copies when
necessary. Limited capacity of the law libraries and the lack of
control prisoners have with regard to scheduling further decreases
access.60 Individuals are charged for copies, which can be quite
expensive, since the material required for preparing a postconviction petition, including case law, supporting documentation,
and the appellate record amount to hundreds or thousands of
pages.61 The cost to acquire these documents is often prohibitive
for a population of individuals who lack the opportunity to
generate income.62 Finally, incarcerated people simply lack the
54

See id.
Jonathan Abel, Ineffective Assistance of Library: The Failings and the Future of
Prison Law Libraries, 101 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1200 (2013).
56
Casey, 518 U.S. at 357 (In the rare case where a court finds actual injury, the
scope of the injunction or other remedy must “be limited to the inadequacy that
produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.”).
57
Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting: Filling in the Gaps of Pro Se Prisoner’s Access to
the Courts, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 278–79 (2010).
58
This number varies by institution.
59
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY STATEMENT: ACCESS TO
PROVIDED LEGAL SERVICES, DC-ADM 007, at 1–2 (2015). See also Robbins, supra note
57, at 279.
60
Samantha Melamed, After Pa. Book Ban, Prisoners Must Rely on Ebooks,
PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/pennsylvaniabook-ban-doc-books-through-bars-wetzel-20181102.html.
61
See, e.g., ABA Guidelines, supra note 41, at 933 (anticipating the entire record
for a capital post-conviction case to comprise “thousands of pages”).
62
See, e.g., Wendy Sawyer, How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each
POL’Y
INTIATIVE
(Apr.
10,
2017),
State?,
PRISON
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/ [https://perma.cc/79N5-KUQW]
(reporting that on average people incarcerated in state and federal prison earn
between fourteen and sixty-three cents for “regular,” non-industry jobs, and between
55

2021]

THE RIGHT TO REMAIN POWERLESS

1009

storage space available in even the most modest law office; most
are limited to the equivalent of four bankers boxes or fewer.63
Often, prison research mechanisms are so restrictive that they
are actually prohibitive. One individual incarcerated in Florida
described the state’s restrictive legal research protocol:
Some prisons in Florida have replaced their hardbound volumes
of federal case reporters with a CD-ROM collection of these
reporters. In theory, this should benefit the pro se prisoner. In
reality, it does not . . . . Prisoners in Florida are not allowed to
use the computers in the law libraries for research purposes. A
pro se prisoner needs to know the name and citation of the case
he wants to read. He must then give the case citation to a law
clerk. The law clerk, when he gets around to it, will then pull up
the case on the computer, and the pro se prisoner may then read
the case off the computer screen and take notes. At no time
during this process is the pro se prisoner allowed to touch the
keyboard; the pro se prisoner must have a law clerk available to
scroll the text up or down. The law library may have three or four
computers in it, but only one is designated for use by the
prisoners who do not work in the law library.64

This model, which is not isolated to Florida, not only prevents
any confidential legal case development, but requires a baseline
expertise in order to conduct any research whatsoever.
Prisons also limit the ability to conduct case-related
investigation by heavily regulating communication with the
outside world. Visitation is a “privilege” that can be adjusted
based on arbitrary factors. Some prisons determine the number
and duration of visits based on one’s behavioral record, the
assessment of an individual’s “need” for visits, or nature of the
incarcerated person’s conviction.65 Some prisons prohibit visitors
who did not know the incarcerated individuals prior to
thirty-three cents and $1.41 for state-owned, correctional industry jobs); State and
Federal Prison Wage Policies and Sourcing Information, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(Apr.
10,
2017),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/wage_policies.html
[https://perma.cc/4XMR-8LXT] (explaining that in Pennsylvania the vast majority of
incarcerated people who are able to have jobs, earn between nineteen cents and fortytwo cents per hour).
63
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY STATEMENT: PERSONAL
PROPERTY, STATE ISSUED ITEMS, AND COMMISSIONARY/OUTSIDE PURCHASES, DCADM 815, at 3–2 (2016) [hereinafter PA., DEP’T OF CORR.].
64
Robbins, supra note 57, at 279 (quoting Thomas C. O’Bryant, The Great
Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation after the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 325–26 (2006)).
65
See Chesa Boudin et al., Prison Visitation Policies: A Fifty-State Survey, 32
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 162 (2013).
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incarceration, which can eliminate the ability of an incarcerated
individual to meet with an investigator or other non-attorney
advocate.66 That is, if an incarcerated person could afford to hire
an investigator.67
Prisons also heavily regulate mail and correspondence. Only
attorney correspondence is confidential. New policies across the
country—purportedly
for
security—prohibit
incarcerated
individuals from receiving original mail, requiring that all mail be
reviewed and copied, a task often outsourced to privately-owned
companies.68 This convoluted process causes significant delays in
mail and dramatically reduces the quality of the mail’s content.69
Many incarcerated people have complained of blurry,
unrecognizable mail and photographs.70
Cost considerations also severely restrict contact with the
outside world, limiting the ability of incarcerated people to
advocate their own cases. The cost of postage, pens, and stationery
all come out of an incarcerated person’s facility account.71
Incarcerated individuals must also pay for their own telephone
calls.72 In Pennsylvania, the telephone system is managed by
Securus Technologies, one of the highly exploitative private prison
contractors that hold monopolies over basic human necessities for
incarcerated people.73 A 2019 report found that in Pennsylvania,
a fifteen-minute call through Securus costs an incarcerated person

66

See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 540.44 (2021).
See Sawyer, supra note 62; PA., DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 63.
68
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections lists the following location St. Petersburg
as one of its mailing addresses for all of its facilities: PO Box 33028 St Petersburg, FL
33733. See, e.g., SCI Phoenix, PA. DEP’T OF CORR. https://www.cor.pa.gov/Facilities/
StatePrisons/Pages/Phoenix.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q62A-57Z7] (last visited June 22,
2022). See, e.g., Mia Armstrong, Is This What Prison Mail Looks Like Now?, SLATE (Dec.
5, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/12/pennsylvania-prison-scanned-mail-smartcommunications.html [https://perma.cc/W6BF-PDPK].
69
Armstrong, supra note 68. Though prisons are required to except attorney mail
from these rules, they do not always do so. See, e.g., Verified Complaint at 2, Hayes v.
Wetzel, No. 1:18-cv-2099 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2018). Nor do these exceptions apply to
incarcerated individuals without counsel.
70
Armstrong, supra note 68.
71
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY STATEMENT: INMATE MAIL
AND INCOMING PUBLICATIONS, DC-ADM 803 (2020).
72
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY STATEMENT: AUTOMATED
INMATE TELEPHONE SYSTEM, DC-ADM 818 (2012).
73
Securus:
Call
Rates
and
Kickbacks,
PRISON
PHONE
JUST.
https://www.prisonphonejustice.org/provider/t-netix/ [https://perma.cc/9A76-A6U6]
(last visited Nov. 9, 2021).
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approximately eighty-eight cents, while that year, the company
generated $3,470,853 in kickback revenue.74
Security has always been the predominant purported
objective in the prison system, and it has been constantly used to
justify a denial of legal access. Overcrowding, deplorable living
conditions, low-level education, unqualified staff, and noise
pollution all contribute to violence, hopelessness, belligerence,
institutionalization, and animosity toward authority.75 Prison
administrators seek to address the effects of these conditions
through harsh rules and regulations that produce more isolation
and confrontation than rehabilitation.76 Institutional infractions
are punishable by stripping basic autonomy and can result in
lengthy stays in isolation.77 Even minor infractions such as
wearing pant hems above the ankles incur a loss of phone or
visiting privileges, an incarcerated person’s lifeline to the outside
world.78 When measured by recidivism rates, it is clear that these
punitive measures have been counterproductive.79 The
documented level of unsuccessful reentry into the community is
partially caused by prison measures that isolate individuals and
further strip them of autonomy.
Funding allocated to prisons is designated primarily for
security needs at the expense of rehabilitation.
In many
institutions, rehabilitative measures and educational programs
have either been denied outright or terminated due to security
concerns.80 Providing incarcerated people access to education and
rehabilitative resources is still largely considered unconventional.
Given that over ninety percent of those incarcerated reenter
society, everyone suffers because of this penological approach to
prison operation.81
74

Id.
See Lorna Collier, Incarceration Nation, 45 MONITOR PSYCH. 56 (2014).
76
See id.
77
Tiana Herring, The Research is Clear: Solitary Confinement Causes LongLasting Harm, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
blog/2020/12/08/solitary_symposium/ [https://perma.cc/TJ2M-U6NR].
78
See Prisoner’s Rights: Discipline and Punishment, JRANK L. (2021),
https://law.jrank.org/pages/9402/Prisoners-Rights-Discipline-Punishment.html
[https://perma.cc/KBK3-ENYL].
79
See RYAN KING & BRYAN ELDERBROOM, IMPROVING RECIDIVISM AS A
PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2–3 (2014), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186
/files/media/document/UI-ImprovingRecidivism.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MZJ-PMK9].
80
This issue has existed for decades. See J. Lillis, Prison Education Programs
Reduced, 19 CORR. COMPENDIUM 1, 1–11 (1994).
81
Timothy Hughes & Doris James Wilson, Reentry Trends in the United States:
Inmates Returning to the Community After Serving Time in Prison, BUREAU JUST.
75
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IV. RESTORATION OF AGENCY: A CASE STUDY
There is important scholarship about the abolition of police
and the carceral state that endeavors to advance the promise of a
better future. But for those locked up today, restoration of
autonomy is a critical and urgent need. Policies must immediately
be enacted to restore agency to those who have been robbed of it
by our criminal punishment systems. As one who directly
experienced and survived the systems discussed above, the author
offers the following case study as a means to facilitate the
restoration of agency for incarcerated persons.82
Graterford Prison was constructed in 1929, with a thirty-foot
wall surrounding two thousand cells spanning five city blocks.83
Its closing in 2018 marked the end of an era.84 While in operation,
access to college courses,85 outside volunteers,86 and community
workshops allowed incarcerated individuals to tap into their
agency, talents, and leadership skills.87 Graterford was unique in

STAT., https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/reentry.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3XK-QGYH]
(last updated Aug. 20, 2003) .
82
Marco Maldonado was sentenced to life without parole and served 28 years in
prison for a crime that he did not commit, before earning two degrees, learning the
law, and successfully litigating his own release.
83
State Prisons, PA. DEP’T OF CORR., https://www.cor.pa.gov/Facilities/
StatePrisons/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/E5GV-5BJT] (last visited June 22,
2022).
84
See Samantha Melamed & Joseph N. DiStefano, What Happened in the Rush
to Open Pennsylvania’s Biggest, Most Expensive Prison? PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 22
2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/sci-phoenix-graterford-pennsylvania-prisonincarceration-wetzel-wolf-20190122.html.
85
The
Villanova
Program
at
SCI
Phoenix,
VILL.
UNIV.,
https://www1.villanova.edu/university/liberal-arts-sciences/about/phoenix.html
[https://perma.cc/Q5FG-CRHB] (last visited June 22, 2022). Villanova University has
a long history at Graterford Prison dating back to the 1970s. Id.
86
See Julie Miller, Let’s Circle Up: An Introductory Restorative Justice Workshop,
HAVERFORD COLL. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.haverford.edu/peace-and-globalcitizenship/news/lets-circle-introductory-restorative-justice-workshop-0
[https://perma.cc/L6M7-ZX8Y]. Inside-Out is another organization that worked with
many incarcerated men at Graterford Prison. About Us: The Story of Inside-Out,
INSIDE-OUT PRISON EXCH. PROGRAM, https://www.insideoutcenter.org/about-insideout.html#story [https://perma.cc/C3LM-MB6R] (last visited June 22, 2022).
87
Organizations created and led by incarcerated individuals at Graterford Prison
were transformational both inside and outside of the prison. See, e.g., Parole
Eligibility Education Initiative, LIFERS INC., https://www.lifersincpa.org
[https://perma.cc/8NK3-S2XA] (last visited June 22, 2022); Graterford State
Correctional Institution, PRISONPRO, https://www.prisonpro.com/content/graterfordstate-correctional-institution [https://perma.cc/46AE-7GRY] (last visited June 22,
2022). Other organizations such as a branch of the NAACP and The Latin American
Cultural Exchange Organization (“LACEO”) operated with success within the prison.
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that it incorporated,88 to a limited degree, the principles posited by
social scientist Timothy Flanagan for a meaningful incarceration
experience: (1) “[m]aximizing opportunities for [the incarcerated
to exercise] choice [in living circumstances]”; (2) “[c]reating
opportunities for the prisoner to pursue a meaningful life in
prison”; and (3) “enhancing the permeability of the institution so
that the offender does not lose all contact with the outside world.”89
Graterford was viewed by social scientists as a needed
response to the demands created by the overpopulated Eastern
State Penitentiary. Initially, the purpose of Graterford Prison was
to warehouse incarcerated men by having them work on the prison
farm.90 Attendance in rehabilitative programs such as schooling
was often the second choice to prison employment due to the
economic strain suffered by most of the incarcerated.
Ultimately, Graterford Prison became a unique institution in
the state of Pennsylvania during the 1970s. At the time, a
traditional punitive approach to punishment was the prevalent
penological model in the nation.91 As the role and efficacy of
incarceration was called into question by social scientists,92
Graterford, albeit significantly constrained, saw the dawn of a new
model. Rehabilitative approaches ranged from interaction with
outside volunteers to educational programs designed to empower
individuals.93 Access to college courses and community workshops
designed to explore issues about criminal justice illustrate a few
examples of Flanagan’s theory in practice within the prison.94
Even the choice to live in a single or double cell was given to many
of those incarcerated behind Graterford’s walls. The goal was to
88
SCI Phoenix, PA. DEP’T OF CORR., https://www.cor.pa.gov/Facilities/
StatePrisons/Pages/Phoenix.aspx [https://perma.cc/XTN9-7NEN] (last visited June
22, 2022).
89
Timothy J. Flanagan, Long-Term Prisoners: Their Adaptation and Adjustment,
2 FED. PRISONS J. 45, 50 (1991).
90
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S PANEL TO
INVESTIGATE THE RECENT HOSTAGE INCIDENT AT GRATERFORD STATE
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION 27 (1982), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/
88092NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LPR-Y3BX].
91
See Jeremy Travis & Bruce Western, The Era of Punitive Excess: The Criminal
Justice System Is Marred by an Overreliance on Excessive Punishment, BRENNAN CTR.
JUST. (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/erapunitive-excess [https://perma.cc/EV48-679T].
92
PAUL GENDREAU, CLAIRE GOGGIN & FRANCIS T. CULLEN, THE EFFECTS OF PRISON
SENTENCES ON RECIDIVISM (1999), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/e199912.htm
[https://perma.cc/RZ3S-4PK2].
93
See, e.g., The Villanova Program at SCI Phoenix, supra note 85.
94
Id.
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allow individuals to access their personal agency through
autonomy. As a result, the prison became a marketplace for the
creation, design, and operation of organizational groups led by
remarkable incarcerated people.95
Graterford Prison was by no means a paragon of rehabilitative
or progressive penology. Significant violence and deprivation of
resources existed within the prison.96 Prison administrators and
staff focused on security at the expense of rehabilitation.97 It was
not until the 1970s that prison administrators realized that an
institutional ethos of agency could exist without compromise to
security.98 With limited administrative interference, incarcerated
people developed, organized, and operated social organizations
and programmatic groups. The Para-Professional Law clinic,99
NAACP,100 LIFERS,101 and other organizations applied and were
granted 501(c)(3) statuses. A minimal level of administrative
oversight existed, but organizational leaders and members
experienced a significant level of personal and communal agency
within the prison context.102 Events, meetings, and fundraisers
were led by the incarcerated.103 Perhaps the most significant
element contributing to participation was the voluntary nature of
organizational and group activity.
95
Parole
Eligibility
Education
Initiative,
LIFERS
INC.,
https://www.lifersincpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/LINC-EligibilityIniative.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6CW-VSST] (last visited June 22, 2022); The Villanova Program at
SCI Phoenix, supra note 85; see LACEO ART & OUTREACH (Nov. 24, 2008),
laceoart.blogspot.com [https://perma.cc/HEJ2-DMRJ].
96
For a description of life at Graterford, including daily violence, see JOSHUA DUBLER,
DOWN IN THE CHAPEL: RELIGIOUS LIFE IN AN AMERICAN PRISON (2013). See also
Samantha Melamed, KFC, Dinosaur Prints, Rock’n’roll: The Stranger-Than-Fiction
Forgotten History of Graterford Prison, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 30, 2018),
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/pennsylvania/sci-graterford-phoenix-history-massincarceration-pennsylvania-montgomery-county-philly-state-prison-eastern-statepenitentiary-20180530.html.
97
See Melamed, supra note 96.
98
Marco Maldonado, A History of the Organizations at Graterford Prison (Spring
2018) (M.A. thesis, California State University Dominguez Hills) (Scholarworks).
99
The Para Professional Law Clinic was founded in 1971 and incorporated as a
non-profit corporation in 1976. The clinic represented incarcerated men both in legal
courts and administrative hearings within the prison. Para-Prof. L. Clinic SCIGraterford v. Beard, 334 F.3d 301, 303 (3d Cir. 2003).
100
The Graterford branch NAACP was established in 1994. It is one of 28 active
prison branches. See Maldonado, supra note 98, at 35–37.
101
LIFERS became an incorporated entity in 1981 whose mission was securing
legislation authorizing parole for people sentenced to life in Pennsylvania. See
Maldonado, supra note 98, at 29–32.
102
See, e.g., Melamed & DiStefano, supra note 84.
103
Id.

2021]

THE RIGHT TO REMAIN POWERLESS

1015

The fact that organizations and groups were led by
incarcerated people attracted membership and participation not
only from within the prison population, but also the greater
community. Villanova University became a presence within the
prison.104 The University provided college courses that afforded
the opportunity to earn a bachelor’s degree.105 Volunteers from the
community participated in various group functions within the
prison.106 Community workshops facilitated by incarcerated
people included participants from the Philadelphia and
Montgomery County District Attorney Offices, professors and
students from surrounding universities and colleges, and
members of the community at large.107 Events and fundraisers
were coordinated and sponsored by the aforementioned prison
organizations that ranged from book drives to cake sales.108 Some
proceeds were funneled back into the prison by providing prizes
for poetry contests and bingo nights.109 More importantly, money
raised funded scholarships and school supplies for students from
impoverished neighborhoods.110 Additionally, religious groups
were allowed to have outside faith members participate in services
inside of the institution.111 Each of these efforts fostered a sense
of community connection with the outside world, and offered the
opportunity for those incarcerated to make the world a better
place.112
104

The Villanova Program at SCI Phoenix, supra note 85.
Id.
106
See Melamed, supra note 96. See COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEP’T OF CORR.,
POLICY STATEMENT: VOLUNTEERS AND INTERNS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, 1.1.6, at 2-1 (2013) [hereinafter PA. DEP’T OF CORR VOLUNTEER
POLICY] (“The facility should utilize volunteers, public visitors and interns in as many
diverse program areas as possible.”); see also supra notes 84, 85, 95.
107
See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 98. See also Samantha Melamed, Can Radical
Listening Transform Prison Culture? One Pennsylvania Institution is Finding Out.,
PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 9, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/just-listeningsharon-browning-philadelphia-kensington-sci-phoenix-pennsylvania-20191110.html.
108
See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 98.
109
Id.
110
Id. n.12 (citing Dan Geringer, Parole Models: Lifelong Friends Work with City
INQUIRER
(Nov.
18,
2013),
to
Help
Former
Inmates,
PHILA.
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/blogs/clout/Parole-models-Lifelong-friends-workwith-city-to-help-former-inmates.html); Graterford Inmates Give Paychecks To
Scholarships, PHILA. PUB. REC. (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.phillyrecord.com/2012/08/
graterford-inmates-give-paychecks-to-scholarships/.
111
See PA. DEP’T OF CORR VOLUNTEER POLICY, supra note 106.
112
Id. at 1–1 (“It is the policy of the Department to permit volunteers and public
visitors to provide a number of direct services to inmates, as well as serving as a link
between the Department and the community.”).
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Despite the buzz, conducting any organizational activity in
prison was laden with obstacles that could never be fully
explained. Scheduling was always an issue. Administrative
hurdles constantly arose; gate clearances were always “lost,”
which led to the cancellation of activities and functions. Prison
lockdowns were unpredictable. The lack of resources such as
computers and updated research materials, coupled with the
overall prison environment, constantly worked against the
incarcerated and those invested from the community. Still, there
were many who continued to participate and commit themselves
to educational and organizational work inside of the prison.
Graterford Prison’s model of rehabilitation has not been
scientifically researched. This could be attributable to the
exorbitant number of people serving death by incarceration
sentences in Pennsylvania.113 It may be that the scientific
community has simply overlooked the prison population.
However, there are other examples demonstrating how peer-led
group activity operates within prison and its effects for those
reentering society.114 Research has demonstrated that access to
quality education in prison lowers the possibility of recidivation
for returning citizens.115 According to a 2014 Rand report,
correctional education for incarcerated adults reduces recidivism
by thirteen percent while being cost effective.116 Incorporating
findings of recent research can effectively change policy that will
help create a more meaningful and connected incarceration
experience, as posited by Flanagan. Consequently, the reentry
process will be ameliorated by employment opportunities that
otherwise would have been unavailable. More importantly,
generational and inter-community incarceration can be
permanently interrupted.
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See COZZENS & GROTE, supra note 43.
See BAZ DREISINGER, INCARCERATION NATIONS: A JOURNEY TO JUSTICE IN
PRISONS AROUND THE WORLD 16–18 (2016); LARRY J. SIEGEL, INTRODUCTION TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 622, 625 (2009).
115
LOIS M. DAVIS ET AL., RAND CORP., HOW EFFECTIVE IS CORRECTIONAL
EDUCATION, AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? THE RESULTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE
EVALUATION (2014), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research
_reports/RR500/RR564/RAND_RR564.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7XQ-MFQZ].
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CONCLUSION
The criminal judicial and carceral systems were designed to
silence individuals and remove their agency. Removal of agency
is effectuated through law enforcement tactics, a decimated right
to counsel, and deeply repressive systemic prison conditions. The
courts have only compounded this problem by closing their doors
to incarcerated people and providing additional mechanisms to
ensure their silence. Working in lockstep, these systems have
stripped individuals and their communities of agency. This
oppressive scheme must be dismantled. And for those locked away
at this moment, policies must be enacted immediately to restore
their autonomy.

